AUKUS, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, An opportunity for Brazil?

AUKUS, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, An opportunity for Brazil?
By Julián Gadano
The united states, the United Kingdom, and Australia announced the constitution of a military agreement spacious, called AUKUS, whose most important point is the provision of weapons and military technology to Australia, including submarine nuclear propulsion. It has been written on the subject -among others, a very good article by Andrew Serbín was published yesterday in PROFILE - in general, putting the focus on the balance in the Asia-Pacific and the irritation of China, and the discomfort that occurred in France, the commercial damage caused by the covenant, competitive of their own contracts of sale.
I propose to focus on another point: the impact of this agreement will result in the status-quo, which, although unstable and imperfect, it was argued at the time. Until today, only six countries were manufactured and operate nuclear-powered submarines: the five powers allowed to have nuclear weapons by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as India (which have not signed the Treaty and also has nuclear weapons). What does this mean? All the countries that have nuclear submarines and operate under its military program, not subject to safeguards civil. In other words, there are no countries without nuclear weapons, which -in turn - have nuclear submarines operating under safeguards civil.
A nuclear-powered submarine, it is not a submarine with nuclear weapons. In appearance, they are similar to any other submarine, and its technology is independent of the type of weapons they are carrying. The difference lies in that the nuclear submarine has an engine powered by nuclear fission instead of burning diesel. This, of course, gives you an enormous military advantage to the countries that they operate: on the one hand, does not require refueling for decades, and on the other, the high efficiency of the nuclear power makes it possible for these submarines to operate at “speed fighter” by longer times of artifacts as with conventional engine. However, it is important to be clear that his possession is not prohibited by the NPT, and -in theory - any country can have.
Everything is not so simple. Existing safeguards agreements obligate you to agree to inspections of the fissionable material that you possess, and a submarine cargo fissile material. How to inspect a mobile device designed precisely in order to not be found? Until now, that balance showed -at this point - a single challenger: Brazil. Our neighbor, no weapon, claiming its right to build a nuclear submarine and has a programme of building active and on the move. If your plans are met, near 2030 there should be a nuclear submarine brazilian transiting the seas, the first -until now - operated by a non-weapons.
Due to this program, Brazil transits from a long time ago by a difficult situation. You are not developing anything that is not allowed, but it has been stopped “in the edge” in front of the powers possessing, which are guided by the principle “the less people, the better.”
But everything changes with the AUKUS. Brazil would no longer be the first and you will have from now a huge umbrella to protect your program: Australia possess nuclear submarines, provided nothing less than by the united States and will be difficult to argue that Brazil breaks balances. There will be those who declare that Australia purchase to third parties and has not built or designed, but without a doubt the debate will rise to another level and Brazil will have a powerful argument to defend its policy. What will capitalize politically Brazil the giant “center” legitimizing of your program that you have to pull?
*This article was published in Profile in October of 2021