IMPACT OF GLOBAL TRENDS ON THE FUTURE OF ANTARCTICA AND THE ARGENTINE INTERESTS OF FACE-TO-2048

Introduction
In view of the disputes geopolitics in Antarcticathe impact of climate change, the pressure by the use of natural resources and the uncertainty of the future of the governance of Antarctica —in the face of possible revision of the Antarctic Treaty System (STA) in 2048—, can be studied how the ideas driving of demography and human development, environment, economy and technology, as well as global trends that have an impact in the spaces geopolitically strategic to Argentina in the South-western Atlantic and the projection of Antarctica, in the fields of strategic affairs, maritime affairs and governance. Issues such as the opportunities of positioning geo-strategically, the access to their natural resources to the increase in its demand world, the scientific and technological advances —in conjunction with the interest in the effects of climate change, the preservation of the ecosystem and biodiversity, the management of tourism with new and increasingly intense participation of human in the continent, including the discussion on the continental shelves —from the revaluation of the seas and oceans—, converted to Antarctica in a region increasingly relevant in the international system.
Considering a scenario towards 2031, a date closer to the 2048, a context, disruptive, of greater uncertainty and international competition, will generate greater imbalances in Antarctica that could lead to a crisis within and outside the current System of the Antarctic Treaty and conflicts between the complaining countries —including Argentina and other countries that today are not part of the same, or that they have not yet claimed sovereignty or unknown claims existing—, unbalancing the current system of governance in Antarctica and by putting in doubt its continuity. In this context, doubts arise about the current weaknesses of the governance of Antarctica, about how the STA will address the problems emerging in the future of the Antarctic and if the governance of Antarctica will survive in its current form and how it will adapt.
From there, it becomes clear that the lack in our country strategies, policies and instruments to manage and strengthen the presence of argentina in the “white continent” with the end of sustain and strengthen the interests antarctic national referring to the claim of sovereignty over the antarctic sector and the possibility of having a leadership role in the region in Antarctica and its governance to the challenges of the future. Also, the lack of political decision-making and economic resources-oriented deprives the country of the integral exploitation of the isla Grande of Tierra del Fuego as a “gateway” to the antarctic continent, with the advantages that would have a pole logistics in Ushuaia as a factor of power and influence in future antarctic and developing capabilities that strengthen the connection Antarctica in the country and contribute to the development.
Context: Antarctica, natural resources, geopolitical importance and logistics
Antarctica is a continent, with unique characteristics that give geopolitical relevance. His area of 14 million square kilometers is covered mostly by a thick layer of ice that covers 98% of the surface, establishing itself as the largest reservoir of drinking water on the planet and one of the main ecological reserves of humanity. It is a continent inhospitable, it has significant natural resources and a unique geo-strategic position, to attract the interest of many international actors. Has No permanent population, except of researchers and military personnel of various nationalities who performed annually scientific activities and logistics. As a result of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the areas to the south of the parallel 60° South are reserved to the development of scientific and technical activities, therefore, there are no commercial activities and consolidates its position as one of the only territories worldwide where flourishes the cooperation between the participating countries. Their conditions and the special features, arouses a great interest worldwide in addition to the troubling perspectives of climate change with the melting of the ice sheets —occurring steadily since 2014, with consequences in increasing the level of the sea, the acidification of the oceans, as well as the role of the continent as a regulator of climate. Charge your attention also by its particular ecosystem formed by very few and unique species and the weak food chain of the Southern Ocean (Fraga, 1983; Ministry of Defence UK, 2018 and Fernández Alonso, Castle Bocalandro and Camacho Solís, 2020).
Variable trends of the air temperature at the surface of Antarctica between 1979 and 2014. The shading cross indicates significant trends. Source: Chown, Steven L. and Brooks, Cassandra M. (October 2019). The State and Future of Antarctic Environments in a Global Context. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Vol. 44, pp. 1-30, 2019.
Changes in the ice mass of Antarctica between 2003 and 2019. Source: Ben-Smith et al. (2020). Pervasive Ice Sheet Mass Loss Reflects Competing Ocean and Atmospheric Processes. Science, vol 368, no. 6496 (30 April 2020), pp. 1239-1242.
The geopolitical importance of the antarctic continent can be observed from political factors-geographical, geo-economic and geostrategic. As regards the first, it stands out in the claims of sovereignty pending as geopolitical aspect of real interest to the seven complaining countries: Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. On the second perspective, it highlights the importance of the continent is given by the natural resources renewable and non-renewable in its mainland and in the surrounding waters of the Southern Ocean. This leads to competition between countries, especially in the event that, before the global demand for resources, an end to the ban on the exploration and commercial exploitation of minerals and hydrocarbons, your time with technological change (and climate) to facilitate the access to the continent and the processes of exploitation, making the activity is economically viable. We have identified various deposits of coal, gas, oil, minerals such as iron, platinum, uranium, copper, chromium, nickel, gold, platinum, diamonds, and others of great importance for the economic activities of contemporary. Among other strategic resources of the Antarctic, is also highlighted are the reservoirs of drinking water —identified as the cause of international conflicts and instability of governments in the future as demand increases due to the growth of the world population and the reduction and pollution of the current sources of this resource, causing water stress in most of the world— and the living resources in the surrounding sea —among them, the krill and fish species such as hake—, which are necessary to the global food crisis and threatened by IUU fishing that looks “attractive” to the Southern Ocean before the collapse because of over-fishing in other regions. In terms of the perspective geostrategic, we identify the maritime communications among the three major oceans, the generation of interest hegemonic —in relation to the assessment granted by the complaining countries, specifically in Argentina and Chile, and its efforts to control the territories— and the possible use in space exploration. In the field of communications is relevant to the control of maritime navigation and air circumpolar and transpolar and strategic aspects-naval in terms of access to the South Atlantic, taking into account the control of the steps from the ocean around the antarctic continent —such as the Drake Passage or Mar de Hoces between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans— that would mean the control of the trade routes and communication (Fraga, 1983; Sepúlveda Cox, 2008; Day and others, 2019; Fernández-Alonso et. al., 2020 and Bellorio Clabot, 2021).
Mineral resources identified in the Antarctic. Source: Curtin, R., Hayes, M., Jakob, A., McClatchy, H., & Schleich, N. (2004). Resources in Antarctica: With the World's dwindling natural resources, is there a chance for exploitation in Antarctica? Gateway Antarctica: Syndicate Reports, University of Canterbury.
This picture incorporates the environmental concern to the effects of climate change and the impact of human activitieshighlighting the Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection (also known as the Madrid Protocol), which declared the continent as a “natural reserve devoted to peace and science” and the growing need for the international community to take all actions necessary to prevent the loss of biodiversity and the ecosystems of the antarctic (Sepúlveda Cox, 2008; Bellorio Clabot, 2021, and The Time, 2021). The improvements in technology, infrastructure, transport and telecommunications have a significant impact on the realities of operational and have led to a sustained increase in researchers and tourists in Antarctica —providing greater increases as the continent more accessible, and providing a better infrastructure for the accommodation of the visitors, with negative environmental impacts, potential risks of accidents that exceed the response capabilities of the regional actors and the possible implications in the regulation and management of the tourism industry Antarctica (Liggett, Frame, Gilbert and Morgan, 2017; Ministry of Defence UK, 2018 and Rothwell, 2021). Two other important economic activities are the fishing in the Southern Ocean —although there are instruments such as the Convention for the Conservation of Living Resources in Marine Antarctic (CCAMLR) responsible for fisheries management in the area of Convergence Antarctica, the illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing remains a major problem, threatening to undermine conservation efforts, adding to the hunting of whales carried out by japanese vessels— and the bioprospectingin search of plant and animal species, valuable for the pharmaceutical, cosmetic, and food. In this activity, the Antarctic Treaty System does not yet have rules to regulate the access and the distribution of benefits arising from bioprospecting. Be warned that when the knowledge becomes economic value, the incentive to share it openly —how is guaranteed in the Treaty— disappear in the pursuit of commercial competition, to apply rules such as intellectual property rights (Discovering Antarctica, s. f.; Ferrada, 2018; Ministry of Defence UK, 2018, and Day et. al., 2019).
The Antarctic, like the Arctic, are regions that are increasingly relevant in the era of globalization, including in the global discussions on energy resources, maritime trade, military security, economic development and environment. Both are part of a “process of rearrangement global” and of the need of the West of new poles of power and influence”. All countries active in Antarctica have interest on your resources and on the white continent are emerging and growing tensions within and outside the Antarctic Treaty System that influence in this system, the stability of the region and its place in the global system. Between the tensions identified include: the extension of the continental shelf in the region —recently observed by the attempt to Chile to extend its continental shelf to the East of the point F is defined by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1984—, disputes over resources and seabed, the tensions for the hunting of whales in the waters Antártidas (caused by Japan), and the tensions between proposals for the creation of marine protected areas in the Southern Ocean, specifically in the Ross Sea and the Weddell Sea. He also joins a growing impact and influence of Russia, the united States and countries outside of the original signatories of the Antarctic Treaty (Dodds and Hemmings, 2013).
Within the consideration of the geopolitics of the entire antarctic continent, there is a geographical space that raises more interest, to the point that it is the only place where overlapping claims to antarctic from three countries —Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom. This is the Antarctic Peninsula, which is identified as the “most latent” in regard to the territorial conflicts (Fernández-Alonso et. al., 2020). It is situated to the north of the Antarctic Polar Circle, about 1000 km from Tierra del Fuego, and not facing the harsh climatic conditions of the white continent and the layers of permanent snow and ice (Sepúlveda Cox, 2008 and Stewart, 2011). This location north with respect to the rest of the continent, it provides the features of geographical and climatological own that allow ready access throughout the year by air and sea as a “gateway” to the Antarctic and make the most of the member countries of the Antarctic Treaty to install their scientific bases here or on its adjacent islands, which joined the civilian settlements in Fortín Sargento Cabral at the argentine station Esperanza, and Villa The Stars in the chilean base Presidente Eduardo Frei Montalva, the only ones of its kind on the continent (Sepúlveda Cox, 2008; Lane, 2018, and Cool Antarctica, s. f.).
By 2020, there are 40 bases of various nationalities only in the extreme north of the peninsula (the Government of Tierra del Fuego, 2020). The condition of the “entrance door” takes on a significance geopolitical particular for the countries of the Southern Cone, american, Argentina, and Chile, being the closest to the antarctic continent, reducing the distances to the logistics centers in Ushuaia and Punta Arenas (Caplan and Eissa, 2015 and Sidewalk, 2018). British authors also added to the Falkland Islands as a gateway to the strategic advantage logistics of its proximity to the antarctic continent (Dodds and Hemmings, 2013). In this regard, recently, both Chile and the United Kingdom have announced projects to improve their logistical capabilities and serve internationally as the gateway to the antarctic continent. In the chilean case, includes the construction of an International Antarctic Center in Punta Arenas —city where they already operate logistically 19 antarctic programmes and national tourism businesses— and the use of the town of Puerto Williams as a starting point for antarctic cruises. For its part, the United Kingdom announced the search for funding to build a major deep-water port in the Falklands to serve the antarctic programmes of the countries in the northern hemisphere (Facchin, 2015; Bertotto, 2021; Mercopress, 2021; Portal Cruises, 2021 and INACH, 2021). In this context, the lack of specificity of the Pole Logistical Antarctic in Ushuaia wasted the opportunity to provide logistics services to the Antarctic from our country.
In terms of resources highlights of the Antarctic Peninsula, its surrounding waters are home to a high percentage of marine plants and animals are endemic. Especially krill, it is estimated that 75% of the antarctic krill resides in the surrounding peninsula, serving of food to large populations of penguins, seals and whales (National Geographic Society, 2019). In turn, its features also make the peninsula in the region of Antarctica most affected by climate change, demonstrating the loss of the ice shelves in their coastal waters with implications in the southern ocean, which arouses great interest on the part of scientists and conservationists (Montes-Hugo et al, 2009 and the National Geographic Society, 2019).
Problem: uncertainty of the future of governance in Antarctica and disputes of sovereignty
The pressure for natural resourcesthe environmental demands and the uncertainty about the future of the governance of Antarctica makes evident the lack of instruments to develop the presence of argentina in the continent in order to assert and preserve the interests antarctic national. In the current geopolitical context, the major powers need new strategies to maintain their economies, are competing for access to the markets and the search for new areas to exploit their resources. There that Antarctica, as inhospitable territory, due to its strategic location and its wealth of resources, copper importance and arouse conflicts of interest between these powers and other countries. The strategic evaluations of this continent can incorporate the possibilities of scientific development and the fact that the great powers have begun to build their positions of power in pursuit of its national security linked to the environmental value. Also, there are countries launching a “race for technological and industrial” with the construction of ships, polar, new infrastructure, and the reopening of scientific basis, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Chile, Brazil and Colombia (Gómez Mombello, 2014; Fernández-Alonso et. al., 2020 and Felizia 2021). In this context, our country is accurate media naval and air and adequate facilities to consolidate and increase its physical presence and logistics capacity in the antarctic continent.
The The Antarctic Treaty system (STA) has proven to be successful to encourage international cooperation and scientific research on the continent, keeping the peace in the region for 60 years, “freezing” the claims of sovereignty, making it easier for research to be of global benefit and developing a management of activities with an emphasis on environmental standards (Liggett, Frame, Gilbert and Morgan, 2017). But, its provisions were not established in perpetuity and a number of emerging challenges that threaten the region and his regime. Luis Valentín Ferrada (2018) argues that the transition to new scenarios, political-legal in the Antarctic will be given by the evolution of factors such as the heterogeneity between the member states participating in this regime; the pressure to internationalize the governance of Antarctica; the unresolved issue of sovereignty; the increasing politicization of discussions scientific-technical Antártidas; and the likely need to exploit the resources antarctic lands more intensively. They can also be considered to be climate change, specific questions about the resources in the Southern Ocean, new business, trends, global socio-economic changes in the scientific research and the legitimacy and role of the current STA.
In view of the wealth Antártidas and skills geopolitical current, added to a future of increased pressures on both social and environmental (by population growth, food crisis, water scarcity and collapse energy, as well as the effects of climate change), are encouraged widespread awareness of that sooner, rather than later, it will be necessary to exploit the resources, antarctic intensively. Many countries —and especially those who do not have claims, such as China, South Korea, India, Japan and Singapore have already raised the idea of benefit from the resources, antarctic with its exploitation threatening clauses the STA in regard to the peaceful use, environmental preservation, and scientific cooperation, to the time you collide with the interests of the countries claimants and those who reserve the right to do so, which can lead to conflict-of-scale in the near future (Gateway House, 2013; Colacrai, 2018; Dodds, 2018; Ferrada, 2018; Ministry of Defence UK, 2018; Day et. al., 2019; Steinbrunner et. al., 2019; Kounalakis, 2020; Fernández-Alonso et. al. 2020 and Rothwell, 2021). For Thalia Day, Bryony Freer, Natasha Gardiner and Henry Irvine (2019), the geopolitical context and environmental today is completely different from the conception of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, during the Cold War, and the system is inadequate compared to the trends driving global change and concerns as IUU fishing from countries that are not part of and the exploitation of resources, warning that the STA “can't survive without amendments after the year 2100”.
In this framework, it is reported that the Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection, may be open to review in 2048 in terms of their moratoria on exploration and mining —in function of their own clauses of article 25—, adding uncertainty to the situation geopolitics in Antarctica and greater pressure on the STA together if the consultative parties decide to let go of the prohibitions that currently exist and begin to make a profit from the mining resources. By then it is expected that these activities are more feasible and economically viable. It should not be forgotten in addition to the drinking water and the role they can have the reservoirs antarctic towards the middle of the current century. This panorama warning about the future of governance in Antarctica and the conservation of its ecosystems, presenting itself as an opportunity for our country to exercise a role in it. It can be considered that the development of mechanisms to prevent any conflict antarctic potential, even before 2048 (if there are sufficient incentives for countries), could avoid conflicts on a large scale. The consultative parties of the system should be proactive in the management and environmental preservation, avoiding that the regime is the subject of criticisms and attempts to modifications. On this basis, the decade of 2030 may be important for the future of Antarctica thinking about to what extent the STA can adapt and survive as a regime of governance successful that respond to the emerging challenges of the TWENTY-first century and beyond.
Between the limitations of the current STA you can identify the lack of their own judicial system and of better governance capabilities. All decisions about the region are made jointly by an international committee —the Consultative Meeting of the Antarctic Treaty (RCTA), which involved only a “select” group of 54 countries, composed by the 12 original signatories, and other large presence in the region, and executed by representatives of active countries in the continent, while prosecutions are carried out through international courts or judicial system of the country of origin of the defendant (Dodds, 2018 and Ministry of Defence UK, 2018). Another issue is the need for consensus in the decision making of the RCTA and other agencies of the STA, whose efficiency can be affected to the increase in the number of consultative parties, hindering the new decision with the risk of the key challenges facing the STA are not properly addressed (Liggett, Frame, Gilbert and Morgan, 2017).
Issues such as the amendment of the Protocol on Protection of the Environment prior to 2048, and the creation of Marine Protected areas (MPAS) in the Southern Ocean —tool valued for the protection of the ecosystem and marine biodiversity in Antarctica— require unanimity among the consultative parties that make up the RCTA) and the Convention for the Conservation of Living Resources in Marine Antarctic (CCAMLR), respectively. This has been evidenced in the difficulties to create an MPA in the Ross Sea, achieved in 2016, but with “expiration date” in 2052, and which still persist to create other in the Weddell Sea in the Antarctic Peninsula and Antarctic Oriental, projects that are supported by countries such as Argentina, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, united Kingdom, United States and organizations such as the European Union, but not by China and Russia because of their fishing interests in the region (Dodds, 2018; Ferrada, 2018; Rosmino, 2021, and Planelles, 2021). Be warned that the fishing activity as well —especially in the IUU, which is expected to be driven by the impacts of climate change, population growth and resource depletion due to over-exploitation in other regions, in the future it might join the underwater mining and the generation of energy in deep waters, indicating how challenged you can be the resource management antarctic lands within the STA, both now and in the future (Dodds, 2018; Ferrada, 2018 and Day et. al., 2019).
Other signs to the STA is due to the lack of clarity in the own system regulations, which have opened their significance to the interpretation, which has led to the exploitation of gaps and possibilities of failure. There are issues such as the exploitation of drinking water and bioprospecting, which have not yet been addressed adequately, and even in regard to the mining, being a possible source of disputes in the future. Considering the pace of action in the adoption of new measures in the STA, it is unlikely that these issues appear in the legislation for several years which could result in a large amount of unregulated activity that is completely out of the control of the system (Day et. al., 2019). Another important issue is pending in the STA is the entry into force of the Annex to the Protocol on Protection of the Environment about the “liability arising from environmental emergencies”, which was signed in Stockholm in 2005 and is still subject to approval and ratification by the Treaty consultative parties (Rothwell, 2021). All of these limitations will be aggravated to 2048 for the territorial claims are not resolved, the wealth of its natural resources and the effects of climate change (Steinbrunner et. al., 2019). In summary, these limitations in the STA and the structures of governance Antarctica require to be taken into account if our country wants to have a role in the redesign and future of the system, committed to their resilience and adaptability.
Network of Marine Protected Areas, existing and proposed in the area of CCAMLR. Source: The Pew Charitable Trusts.
In the scope of the security, is estimated to be in the future a significant increase in the military presence in Antarctica to support a growing number of civilian operations. The use of the military instrument is referred to in the STA for the support logistics of scientific research, prohibiting manoeuvres military character, although it warns that in the future, the increase of human presence and possible illegal activities —as there are operations thereon as the Patrol Antarctica Naval Combined between Argentina and Chile— mandated armed forces present there to monitor, intervene and react quickly; or even the possibility that an incident occurs “accidental or deliberate, involving ships, aircraft or personnel military (Ministry of Defence UK, 2018).
In reference to the sovereignty asserted on the continent —a field where they enter in the game the interests antarctic lands of our country, identify possible tensions product of the territorial claims, especially between the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile, as well as other countries such as China and some asian and south american teams that have expressed their interest territorial or referred only to the exploitation of natural resources, adding the alleged rights of the united States and Russia to future claims. Another important element of tension Antarctica, it is the sovereignty dispute by the Falkland islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich and its maritime areas surrounding between Argentina and the United Kingdom. In this framework, a geopolitical can be associated to Antarctica in the South-western Atlantic as “complex systemic”, in the framework of the Question of the Malvinas; inserting the antarctic continent within a design geopolitical more broad around the South-western Atlantic, and remembering together the two disputes. If one takes account of the british occupation in a whole chain of archipelagos in the South Atlantic, in addition to the presence of military bases of NATO in the islands of Ascension and the Falklands, the presence of the United Kingdom happens to be relevant to the patrolling, monitoring, and deployment of its military forces in both the South Atlantic and in the Antarctic (Fraga, 1983; Caplan and Eissa, 2015; Fernández Alonso and others, 2020; Ministry of Defence UK, 2018).
Interests in conflict
The current disagreements geopolitical over Antarctica, which are likely to intensify, can be seen from three categories: seven countries claimants prior to the Treaty (1959), the “claimants reserved” and those non-claimants (Gateway House, 2013). The first seven countries —including the us— share some strategic interests among themselves, although varying in “aspects of form and the perception of rights”, and are related to the sovereignty, the delimitation of their continental shelves, natural resources, the control of the lines of communications and the protection of the environment. Together, they hold an enormous weight and influence in the problems antarctic thanks to his work political, scientific, and operational and preserved to a large extent the governance of Antarctica. Between them, the countries of the southern hemisphere are the ones who give more importance to the continent in their governments and policy formulation, including the public culture, differing from the countries of the north, due to its geographical proximity. In the future, they may be more interested in exercise effectively their claims while it is concerned about the possibility that their rights are challenged by other nations. In the Antarctic East, Australia and New Zealand show you more opportunities to collaborate among themselves, while the focus of greatest tension will be West Antarctica, home to the aforementioned important and disputed Antarctic Peninsula, in conjunction with the archipelagos of sub-antarctic and the steps from the ocean (Gateway House, 2013; Sepúlveda Cox, 2008; Dodds et. al., 2017 and Ferrada, 2018).
The south american countries show a greater strategic interest, especially Argentina and Chile, for their condition of claimants, with other countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay who are interested in continuing their mission of research in Antarctica (Ministry of Defence UK, 2018). About 30 countries around the globe currently operate about 90 scientific research facilities, adding new potential claimants. It is often seen that the bases Antártidas contribute to the legitimacy of the territorial claims, by providing the means to sustain permanent physical presence, and can be centers of industrial activities and sightseeing in the future, which could contribute to disputes, geopolitical (Ministry of Defence UK, 2018 and Steinbrunner et. al., 2019). For some authors, one of the ways to sustain the claims of sovereignty is the physical presence in Antarctica through research stations, as our country is that most bases and facilities of this type has. It can be argued that sovereignty in Antarctica “is constructed by using the effective presence in the territory and the exercise of peaceful and cooperative science”, highlighting our country with the greatest presence alongside the united States, Russia and the United Kingdom. If you take into account all of the countries present, the seven claimants deployed almost double the amount of staff in the Antarctic, the sum of all the other antarctic programmes. Other authors added to the scientific ambitions and of research, which may have political motivations, or based on future exploitation of resources, antarctic, the contribution to scientific knowledge —and it was pointed out that several countries have plans to increase the number of research stations and research— and the employment of the armed forces in operations Antártidas. They can even join other symbolic actions to reaffirm their identity Antarctica by other means; for example, to impose national names in the geography Antarctica (Fraga, 1983; Dodds, 2014; Caplan and Eissa, 2015; Knott et. al., 2015; Dodds, Hemmings, and Roberts, 2017; Ferrada, 2018; Steinbrunner et. al., 2019 and Felizia, 2021). In summary, to have a physical presence visible remains a priority for all States involved.
Taking into account the interests of antarctica argentina, a so-called special attention must be made to the british interestsin relation to the above-mentioned sovereignty dispute over the islands of the South-western Atlantic and their surrounding waters, are complemented with the claims of sovereignty antarctic lands of the British Realms Australia and New Zealand —which comprise two-thirds of the white continent—. British authors recognize the intentions of the United Kingdom compete for the supremacy of his claim of sovereignty, which overlap with those of Argentina and Chile, including, among other actions, impositions to the place names in Antarctica, including a tribute to Queen Elizabeth II in 2012 (Fraga, 1983; Dodds and Hemmings, 2013; Dodds, 2014 and Ferrada, 2018). It further cautions that the future tensions can generate new partnerships (Gateway House, 2013). In this framework, and recently, the conformation of the alliance AUKUS could enhance the rule of the british in the South Atlantic, conditioning the disputed Falklands with projection of Antarctica and its future. Following Australia, you can highlight that in 2016 the government of that country presented a strategy Antarctica that includes a plan of action to 20 years. In the same set interest antarctic strategic and scientists in Australia —ranging from the defence of its sovereignty for the support of a Treaty Antarctic “strong and effective”— and a vision for the future of the region and its commitment there, with attention to exercise a leadership role. In the action plan establishes a significant funding “to support a scientific program antartic world-class”, to build a new icebreaker, new research facilities, and an airstrip paved to increase the number of flights, as well as expand the role of Hobart (Tasmania) in the field of logistics Antarctica (Australian Government, 2016, and McGee and Liu, 2019). Design and implement a document of similar features that could be useful for our country.
Two other countries that are relevant to the analysis are The united states and Russia, that are highlighted by their physical presence and activities on the continent. Both have not been formally claims of sovereignty during the process of the Antarctic Treaty, but reserve the rights to do it, and are unaware of the claims existing (Gateway House, 2013; Steinbrunner et. al., 2019 and the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, s/f). Russia has expressed interest in developing research, geological and geophysical, with a view to the exploitation of minerals and hydrocarbons in the Southern Ocean (Knott et. al., 2015 and Day et al., 2019). In regard to the third category, you should pay special attention to those countries not complaining, which is incorporated into the Antarctic Treaty System of late —or not yet—, being “left out” of the current system of governance, and even with the risk that they consider that the system has no legitimacy. In particular, these countries stand out for having special interests in the exploration and exploitation of natural resources looking to increase their capabilities in place to reinforce the historical values of the STA. These newer members are “emerging economies” that are looking to become relevant actors in a new international system, such as China and India, to which you can add other asian countries like South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia, promoting activities relating to the exploitation of natural resources, antarctic. Some of them, in the past decades, sought that the antarctic affairs is internacionalizaran under the United Nations and not “select” the Antarctic Treaty System (Gateway House, 2013; Knott et. al., 2015; Liggett, Frame, Gilbert and Morgan, 2017; Colacrai, 2018; Ferrada, 2018; Ministry of Defence UK, 2018; McGee and Liu, 2019; and Fernández Alonso et. al., 2020). In terms of Chinain the framework of its global ascent, already in the first decade of the present century that the chinese government has doubled spending in antarctic affairs. During this period, renewed its two existing bases and built two new ones —along with a fifth to open in 2022 in the Ross Sea, this equals the number of U.s.—, modernized its icebreaker polar and established a logistics center in Shanghai. It has been noted that some of his research are included in the possible exploitation of the resources, antarctic (Knott et. al., 2015 and Liu, 2019). A fourth group to consider are the countries that are completely out of the Antarctic Treaty System and, therefore, their activities are not regulated, with possible future consequences (Day et. al., 2019).
Map of the seven claims of sovereignty, and the locations of the permanent bases in Antarctica. Source: Australian Antarctic Data Centre.
Reflections for our country
The challenges together, and the trends presented here will continue and will impact on the stability and governance of Antarctica to 2048, or even before, and require our country to take action if you want to participate in the future of the continent, both within the Antarctic Treaty System as well as in relation to the “Argentinean Antarctic Sector”, the result of the recognition of the continent as a space is of strategic interest to permanent for the Argentine Republic, in function of your claim and historical presence since 1904.
In the face of geopolitical and geostrategic that are expressed to other international actors —including the United Kingdom, which has interests in conflict with our position— and that can have global effects of unfavorable long-term, it becomes necessary to think about policies intended to increase the presence, sustain, and protect the national interests in the “white continent”. One possible way is to articulate the space antarctic in regarding the maritime space in the South-western Atlantic encompassing both in the design and implementation of a maritime strategy jointtaking into account the approach of the sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom around the islands Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur and its maritime areas surrounding. You can also tackled the issue Antarctica with a strategic planning for the program argentinean antarctic, using the necessary resources and contemplating a co-operation and proper articulation between the different national bodies participating as the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Science and Technology, as well as the three armed forces and scientific institutions (Instituto Antártico Argentino and CONICET) and educational.
In the second place, it must take into account the need for capabilities, naval and air suitable to consolidate the physical presence in Antarctica, accompanied by an adequate infrastructure for scientific research. In this respect, and in the third place, the product of the facilities and distinctive advantages that it offers, the Land of Fire as the tip of entry nearest to the continent, should be considered to have logistics facilities appropriate under national flag that could be a strategic assets for the country and provide a role of international leadership in the field of logistics services for the entire community Antarctica; project has not materialized in Ushuaia, and in the base, Antarctic Petrel due to a lack of military resources, and adequate scientific, added to the existence of projects that are feasible, but decades, have been falling apart for lack of political decision-making. The delay of its realization is in danger, the utilization of the advantages of our country in favour of the projects developed by Chile and the United Kingdom, who are in the greatest state of progress.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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